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The issue of African identity is arguably the central plank of 
contemporary African philosophy due mainly to historical and 
contextual reasons. While the almost inadvertent attention to the 
theme highlights African philosophy as a discipline that is 
responsive to the exigencies of its immediate fulcrum, the attitude of 
many Africans in real life to the factors that undergird identity 
betrays this apparently worthy attention. This essay reviews the 
import of the issue of identity in contemporary African philosophy 
vis-a-vis the language policy of most African countries as well as the 
attitude of many Africans towards their indigenous languages. Given 
the pivotal importance of language in ensuring cultural identity it 
argues that there is an antithesis between the quest for identity and 
the neglect of African languages and concludes that the revival of 
African sense of identity requires a transvaluation of African values. 
 
Introduction 
To speak of contemporary African philosophy bespeaks of 
historicity of the sub-discipline. It is an affirmation that African 
philosophy is historical, as well as a statement against the views of 
scholars like C. B. Okolo (1992: 35) that African philosophy started 
with PlacideTempels’ Bantu Philosophy. That Okolo’s view is not 
defensible should be taken for granted given the current state of 
research on the history of African philosophy. Today we have 
histories of African philosophy taking full consideration of Ancient 
Egyptian philosophy, philosophy of North African Christian fathers 
of the Church, Islamic African philosophy, philosophy of diaspora 
Africans in pre-contemporary period, including Anton Wilhelm 
Amo, and of course, contemporary African philosophy.  
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Like all traditions of philosophy, all the epoch of history of 
African philosophy may not provide a seamless whole. Western 
philosophy between the end of the Ancient period and the 
rediscovery of Aristotle and Plato in later medieval period did not 
know much of Greek philosophy. Before the rediscovery of Aristotle 
and Plato, John of Salisbery was appalled by the level of 
philosophical teaching going on in some cathedral schools in Paris. 
Having left the place for a few years, he returned to find the same 
teachers rehearsing the same information they had given in his 
earlier visit. This is not to say that there was not serious effort at 
reflection. Though there is no doubt that the rediscovery of Aristotle 
served as a booster to philosophical learning in new medieval 
universities, it goes without saying that without the Greek 
philosophers there were thinkers who made deep philosophical 
reflections. What is of central importance in all these epochs of 
African philosophy is that each of the extant reflections is nurtured 
by influences which to all intent and purposes were philosophical, 
contextual and also African. 
In terms of the influence at play in philosophical reflections, 
contemporary African philosophy stands out in a very special way. It 
is a philosophical epoch especially marked by the outcome of the 
encounter between Africa and Western culture, civilization and 
militarism. It does not mean that the influence of the West shaped 
the whole of contemporary African philosophy, since that epoch also 
takes account of Ethnophilosophy or traditional African philosophy 
which represents the thoughts of Africans in their milieu untainted 
by the later European or indeed any foreign influences. It was from 
such thinkers that Henry Odera Oruka was seeking to find the basis 
for his conviction that independent critical sages existed in Africa 
who were able to stand aside and make personal criticism of their 
culture, social practices and beliefs. Still the specificity of much of 
contemporary African philosophy is that it is strongly influenced by 
the issue of African identity. Dismas Masolo was apt in naming his 
book, acclaimed by Barry Hallen as the first history of African 
philosophy, as African Philosophy in Search of Identity (1994). 
In this essay we explore the place of the issue of identity in 
contemporary African philosophy, by reviewing the origin and some 
of the outcome or results of the quest for identity among African 
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philosophers. We will highlight the ambivalence or antithesis of this 
central issue and see how this ambivalence is clearly reflected in the 
position of African language in language policies as well as the 
practices and attitudes of Africans in general towards their numerous 
indigenous languages. The position of indigenous African languages 
vis-à-vis the quest for African identity will be used to reaffirm the 
position of Kwasi Wiredu that African cultures through their passage 
through colonialism have changed fundamentally. 
 
African Identity 
The issue of identity itself and how it became the central issue in 
contemporary African philosophy is itself very historical. For 
Wiredu, the question of African identity is not an attempt to apply 
the metaphysical laws of identity and excluded middle. It is not 
whether Africans are Africans. It is rather a normative question, 
whether African are what they should be. Thus the question raises a 
negative feeling, for people do not usually spend much time in 
asking what they should be as a people, a country or a continent. 
This negativity is created by the historical experience of the African 
with the West, starting from the time of slavery. For Frank Snowden 
(1983) the classical view of blacks was not negative among ancient 
Europeans. His research indeed indicates that Blacks were taken by 
ancient Europe as models of beauty. It was after the experience of 
slavery that the negative conception of blacks took root. This 
historical event was aided by later conquest and direct colonialism 
by European powers aided by their obvious advantage in sciento-
technology. 
It should not be overlooked that just a few hundred years 
back, Europe had not gained its technological head-start that enabled 
it to virtually subjugate the rest of the known world. The trans-
Atlantic slavery was necessitated by the need for cheap labour after 
the American continents were colonized, subjugated and exploited 
and more reliable work hands were needed to cultivate the vast 
plantations gained in this exploit. This debilitating phenomenon 
lasted for over 300 years and millions of Africans were shipped to 
the Americas and Europe. 
By the time the process of capturing and enslaving Africans 
was started, Europe through its contacts with the rest of the world 
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had cultivated cultural triumphalism with the implication of utter 
denigration for other cultures and people of the world. Slave dealing 
was a process of complete dehumanization. The Africans who left 
were not only required to divest themselves of all traces of their 
culture, they were also divested of their humanity. They were not 
allowed to retain their names, speak their languages or maintain any 
link with their roots. While slavery had existed in the world before 
trans-Atlantic slavery, the special feature of the trans-Atlantic 
slavery was that it was linked with racism in addition to extreme 
cruelty and dehumanization. It is no wonder that Joseph Anene 
described it as the most wicked transaction in human history.(1979) 
Trans-Atlantic slavery had a telling effect on the way the African 
was seen by others, and one may add, by himself. George B. N. 
Ayittey asserts that slavery though at an end by 1840 “left the 
African persistently stigmatized as inferior.” (1992: 5). 
The end of trans-Atlantic slavery was quickly followed by 
direct colonialism. With the industrial revolution, slave labour was 
becoming more and more unprofitable. It was incidentally at this 
time that the much vaunted anti-slavery movement started to raise its 
voice. Slavery was first legally banned in England in 1807 but 
continued for some decades later. But the effects of industrialization 
necessitated direct colonialism in the quest for raw materials and 
market. These selfish ends were intellectually clothed in the pretence 
of civilizing mission to Africa. Africa became depicted as a dark 
continent that needed the promethean light from the civilization of 
Europe. The people were taken as inferior and needed to be raised to 
the level of ‘civilized humanity’. Hannah Arendt was right in her 
view that without imperialism, past racism, like that of the 
Enlightenment would have disappeared had the scramble for Africa 
and the consequent imperialism not exposed Western humanity to 
fresh shocking experiences: “Imperialism would have necessitated 
the invention of racism as the only possible “explanation” and 
excuse for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had ever existed in the 
civilized world.” (quoted in Mudimbe, 1988: 108). 
Thus colonialism occluded Western self-interest and 
progressed with complete denigration of all that was African. To 
justify colonialism and cultural subjugation, Africa was presented as 
a continent without history, without geography, literature, culture, 
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civilization and of course, philosophy. The degrading effect of 
slavery was therefore reinforced by colonialism. In spite of the 
glorified conception of their discipline, most major philosophers of 
the West aligned themselves with the racist prejudices and 
misconceptions of their society vis-à-vis the African. 
David Hume who had virtually no experience of blacks and 
of Africa was bold enough to abandon all the critical foundations of 
his philosophy to “suspect” that the entire African race and in fact all 
other human races are inferior to whites. His argument is that there 
was never any great nation among them, and that there was no 
individual great in action or speculation, no gifted manufacturer, no 
art and sciences among these races. He contrasts them with his own 
race and claimed that even the less privileged of them can some time 
exhibit signs of inventiveness, but the blacks that were enslaved in 
white countries have never shown any sign of greatness. For Hume 
such uniform and persistent outcome must be due to the nature of the 
different races. (cf Immerwahr 1992: 23) Hegel describes Africa 
based on the same parameters as “unhistorical continent, with no 
movement or development of its own.” (1975: 190). After outlining 
his categorical imperative, Immanuel Kant did not find it 
contradictory to habour terrible racist views about Africans, detailing 
how the African could be physically abused given his toughness of 
his skin. (Eze: 1997) 
It is notable that all these philosophers were working with 
the presumption of the humanity of their subject. Only a notable 
exception like Charle de Montesquieu clearly stated that the African 
was not human. His reason for this belies all his power of reflection. 
He was only able to describe the physical features of what was for 
him the typical African and concluded that it was impossible for him 
to take him as human, for if he was human, then the Europeans 
would not be qualified to be called Christians (1989). Unusual as his 
position may be, it is obvious that Montesquieu was more consistent 
at least with his Christianity than Hume, Hegel and Kant were with 
their philosophy. At least his position was taken in defence of the 
Christianity of the West and he was insightful enough to realize that 
they would not be Christians given their treatment of the blacks if 
these blacks were indeed human beings. 
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Before the African, thinkers of the Enlightenment betrayed 
all the principles on which their epistemological project rested. But 
this betrayal is even more general in Western philosophy. For 
instance, from Augustine to Aquinas and to the modern time, 
Western philosophy has debated on the conditions for a just war. But 
throughout this period of debate what reigned was the right of 
conquest. Ben Ramose describes this as “I conquer, therefore I am 
right.” It is remarkable that while Western war lords were all over 
the world in their quest for colonial space, hardly any notable 
philosopher ever spoke against their conquests in the name of the 
just war theory. Rather what could not be hidden was the obtuse 
racism of the ilk of Hume, Hegel and Kant, raising a big question 
mark on the acclaimed independence, objectivity, insightfulness and 
ultimacy of philosophical reflections in general. As late as 1916, 
Bertrand Russell was still arguing in his Principles of Social 
Reconstruction that Germany as a great nation had the right to 
colonies. It was the period of the First World War, and Russell was 
of the view that to respect Germany, other nations or people should 
be given to them to subjugate. 
However, the betrayal of philosophy by its Western 
practitioners is not as significant as the way these entire events 
influenced the Africans who were subjected to them. George B. N. 
Ayitteh lamented that even though slavery had come to an end by 
1840, it left the African permanently stigmatized as inferior (1995: 
35). It is unfortunate that while external observers may think of 
Africans in that manner, many Africans also regard themselves as 
inferior as well. For Joseph Nyasanyi, the history of oppression 
against the African cannot but leave a strong negative impact on his 
psyche. He writes: “the long years of exploitation, humiliation, 
subjugation, vilification and utter contempt for human equality and 
dignity has gradually and progressively brought about a sad process 
of mental, spiritual and social degeneration of the colonized 
African.” (1994: 183) 
But the African that the white man encountered at the period 
of direct colonialism was much more confident than to think of 
himself as inferior to other human beings. The Igbo of Southern 
Nigeria can serve as just one example here. In 1906 Colonel Kembal 
wrote that Igboland was the most troublesome part of Nigeria 
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(Isichei, E.: 1973). In 1937 a colonial anthropologist C. K. Meek 
congratulated the colonial government for its effort in bringing peace 
in Igboland because for him, they were the “most lawless part of 
Nigeria.” (1937: xiii) This attitude of the Igbo can very easily be 
seen to be an outcrop of their native egalitarianism and 
republicanism. The Igbo practiced a democratic system that was so 
complete that it is hardly replicable in any other place. James 
Africanus Horton a descendant of Igbo recaptives in Sierra Leone 
wrote of the Igbo: “The Egboes cannot be driven to an act; they are 
most stubborn and bull-headed, but with kindness they could be 
made to do anything, even to deny themselves of their comfort.” (J. 
A. Horton in T. Hodgkin, 1975: 352). This attitude is very much 
backed by their democratic ethos which another colonial 
anthropologist Sylvia Leith-Ross expressed as follows: “So natural 
did it seem to find autocracy in some form or other wherever one 
went in Africa that it was impossible even to imagine a democracy 
so absolute as that of the Igbo.” (Leith-Ross, S., 1939: 67) 
This general feature of self-confidence and independence 
can be exemplified in the Izzi people of Ebonyi State of Nigeria. 
During the era of colonial conquest, the Izzi people could not 
stomach the subjugation of a foreign power over their people. To the 
colonial messenger that was sent to them they emphasized that they 
(the Izzi) recognized the heavens above and the earth beneath, and 
that apart from these two cosmic potentates, they (the Izzi) 
constituted the third force, and would therefore not take orders from 
any human authority (Oguejiofor, 2001: 41). It would be interesting 
to compare this pre-colonial attitude and confidence of the Izzi 
people with the attitude of their descendants in relation to 
Europeans. But this rebuff was of no consequence in the colonial 
subjugation of the people. 
Following the encounter between Europe and Africa, the 
logic of conquest held sway, backed by the false claim that African 
had no history, no culture, no civilization. The acceptance of foreign 
cultures led to many telling consequences. African religion was 
quickly abandoned and many became Christians or Muslims. 
Education became Western styled and was aimed from the beginning 
to alienate the subject from his culture and context. European way of 
life became status symbol for the elite and privileged. This attitude is 
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reflected in some very widely used sayings among Africans: 
Mbaraediekpo (Efik: the white man is a spirit), Bekeewuagbara 
(Igbo).  The flexibility in African naming custom ensured that this 
attitude towards the white man and his ways also entered into many 
African names. In addition to bearing foreign names as sign of 
entrance into new religions, some Africans were named in adulation 
of the white man: Bature (Hausa: white man), Onyiboka (Igbo: 
white man is greater), Nwabekee (Igbo: child of the white man). 
 
Identity and Contemporary African Philosophy 
In effect the above is the terrain in which contemporary African 
philosophy found itself. It is commendable that from the beginning it 
took that situation very seriously, and faced its consequences. As far 
back as the 19the Century, Edward Wilmot Blyden had started 
calling attention to the special feature of Africans as a race with a 
goal which it will be suicidal to check. It is for him like a mission 
that must be fulfilled. He called for the unity of Africa and Africans, 
and became known as the father of Pan-Africanism. Blyden 
encouraged African Americans to return to Africa and help in the 
building of the continent, and this was part of his adherence to the 
movement of Ethiopianism one of which notable advocates he was. 
Blyden was also one of the earliest forebears of the concept of 
African personality and inveighs against those who would advocate 
the unity of all humanity in the following words:  
Let us do away with the sentiment of Race. Let us 
do away with our African personality and be lost, if 
possible in another race.” This is as wise or as 
philosophical as to say, let us do away with 
gravitation, with heat and cold and sunshine and 
rain. Of course, the Race in which these persons 
would be absorbed is the dominant race, before 
which, in cringing self-surrender and ignoble self-
suppression they lie in prostrate admiration. 
While W. E. B. Dubois and others were working and arguing for 
racial equality, Blyden and later Malcom X wanted a space for 
themselves as Africans because of the distrust engendered by years 
of subjugation and racial prejudice. It was impossible to believe that 
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egalitarianism and social justice was possible in the thwarted racial 
relationship that reigned in the new world. 
Much later Placide Tempels would give the quest for 
African identity a more manifest philosophical foothold by his book 
Bantu Philosophy. Tempels was moved by his better understanding 
of the Bantu after ten years of missionary work among them. Much 
as his book was praised, it is in reality a paternalistic attempt to 
outline the thought of the Bantu with their hidden logic. Tempels’ 
aim was to help missionaries to evangelize better and colonialist to 
better colonise. His research was motivated by the conviction that 
philosophy was a cultural universal and so every culture must have a 
philosophy by which it lives. In fact the presence of philosophy was 
linked to the humanity of the human, and so Tempels became also 
the first person to use philosophy as a means of affirming African 
humanity. Thus for him if primitive people had no philosophy, then 
they would be removed from the category of humanity. Even though 
his fellow Europeans in Congo failed to understand him, his book 
became a lightning rod to many of African thinkers of the time. 
Alioune Diop, the writer of the preface to the French edition 
described Bantu Philosophy as “the most decisive work he had ever 
read.” Leopold Senghor aped its doctrine as an authentic sample of 
African metaphysics copying the whole gamut of the theory of vital 
force and its influence on the activities and life of all beings. (1965: 
36 – 37) Diop’s and Senghor’s adulation of Bantu Philosophy is a 
throwback to their assimilationist background. They were products 
of French colonial policy which effectively created classes of human 
beings within their domain. The assimilés were the privileged class, 
with all the pecks of this class. The Africans who enjoyed that 
luxury were nevertheless alienated. Senghor gave expression to this 
alienation in his poetry one of which reads: “Yesterday was All 
Saints, the solemn anniversary of all the dead … In all the 
cemeteries, there was no one to remember.” Senghor was 
overwhelmed by the necessity for a culture or a people to contribute 
something to global civilization. Any culture that has nothing 
worthwhile to contribute; no “unique message which only they can 
proclaim” becomes a museum piece (1965: 98). That underlies his 
insistence on blackness and its beauty, objectified, something 
different! 
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It was also on the necessity of difference that reason 
becomes Hellenic and emotion becomes African, a position for 
which Senghor has been most severely, and sometimes unfairly 
criticized. Without knowing it, Senghor played into the logic of the 
Otherness of the Other, which was the base of the European 
justification of colonial subjugation and the right of conquest. 
Negritude was “enveloped and specified within the Otherness of the 
Other as projected by European metaphysical and delusionary self-
conception” (Serequeberhan, 1994: 46). Senghor bought into Levy-
Bruhl’s pre-logism of the African in his eagerness to exhibit his 
specificity. For him, the European: 
takes pleasure in recognizing the world through the 
reproduction of the object … the African from 
knowing it vitally through image and rhythm. With 
the European the cords of the senses lead to the 
heart and the head, with the African Negro to the 
heart and the belly. (Senghor, 1956: 58). 
That is not to say that he was altogether boxed into the corner of 
Negritude. Senghor was an accomplished Francophile who never 
tired of praising Latinité and Arabité. He had a very wide horizon in 
which every culture will play an important and specific role. He was 
thus universalist or globalist but with the insistence that Africa must 
have a place, a respectable place by bringing something to the table. 
He is convinced that only by so doing that the continent will take its 
place in the civilization of the universal: “that panhuman 
convergence towards which mankind is tending.” (Ba, 1973: 153) 
More professional philosophers started academic philosophy 
in modern African universities by first arguing whether Africa had a 
philosophy and if so what its nature should be. It was an attempt to 
give answer to the hidden question of humanity raised by Tempels’ 
Bantu Philosophy. It is from this debate that different currents 
emerged in contemporary African philosophy. Ethnophilosophy 
followed the lead given by Tempels and Marcel 
Griaule’sConverstion with Ogotemmeli. (1965) They argued 
forcefully that philosophy is universal and Africa must also have its 
philosophy to be found in its folklore, folktales, proverbs, myths, 
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religion, etc. The self-acclaimed professional group insisted that 
philosophy was a critical enterprise and Kwasi Wiredu distinguished 
between first and second order reflections placing philosophy in the 
domain of the second order which uses the first order as a starting 
point. Okere’s hermeneutical movement is akin to this, 
distinguishing between philosophy and non-philosophy, with non-
philosophy roughly represented by Wiredu’s first order reflections. 
Henry Odera Oruka bought into the ideas of critical 
professional philosophy with the proviso that these existed even in 
African traditional settings unencumbered by colonial and 
missionary influence. His aim was to fish out these critical sages and 
present them as the philosophers of a continent in a deep quest. 
Thinkers of the Nationalist ideological current can be said to be 
philosophers in spite of themselves since hardly any of them had the 
slightest philosophical pretension. They were foisted on the terrain 
to give vent to the idea that we must also have our own political 
theorists. But the historical current made its aim of fostering African 
identity as clear as possible. Its project was to trace African 
philosophy to the patrimony of Ancient Egypt and so prove that 
even Western philosophy through the mediation of its fulcrum, 
Ancient Greece, owes its root to philosophy of Ancient Egyptians. 
George G. James asserted that the end of his research in Stolen 
Legacy (1954) was to convince young blacks that their ancestors left 
respectable philosophical reflections appropriated by Ancient 
Greece, and thus to enable them develop self confidence in the 
actual world. James’ Stolen Legacy is therefore squarely in the 
service of African identity which as we have pointed out is the 
guiding principle of philosophic reflections in contemporary Africa. 
It is in the intellectual context of subjugation and denigration 
that this question of identity finds its root. Philosophy of African 
identity was therefore a bold attempt at self-assertion, self-
reassurance and in fact the affirmation of humanity of the African in 
line with Tempels’ argument. For Serequeberhan, philosophy was 
“tacitly privileged as the true measure of the humanity of the human 
as such.” (1994: 3). This is itself is the outcrop of the presupposition 
that reason was the sole preserve of Western or European humanity. 
Since those who were not logocentric or those who were emotive 
could not have a philosophy, it became axiomatic that the 
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philosophy loaded with honorific sense became the highest 
expression of the humanity of the human. But these conclusions 
were reached, in the words of Serequeberhan “without even the 
benefit of an argument” but nevertheless African philosophic 
discourse acquired the aim of “redeeming the humanity of the 
human in colonized African existence.” (p.3). This background also 
serves as a focus for contemporary African philosophy. For Eboussi-
Boulaga, philosophy in this sense becomes a desire to attest to a 
contested humanity (undesird’attesterunehumanitéconstestée) (1977: 
7). 
African Identity and African Languages 
Given this strong concentration on the question of identity and of 
African humanity, it becomes necessary to ask how seriously the 
issue was taken in practical life to obviate the great questions raised 
by what Eboussi-Boulaga called contested humanity. Here let us 
concentrate on the place of African language vis-à-vis colonial 
languages in most African countries. This issue helps to see the 
extent that the alienation of African humanity by the consequences 
of colonial encounter is viewed with seriousness beyond the bounds 
of philosophic reflections. Language is not only the vehicle of 
culture; it is also very significant in constructing self-identity, 
serving to “construct our sense of ourselves – our subjectivity.” 
(Norton, B. 2013: 32). Subjectivity itself is discursively constructed 
within both social and historical context. Consequently, identity is 
constructed by and through language: 
By extension every time language learners speak, 
they are not only exchanging information with 
members of the target language community, they are 
also organising and reorganising a sense of who 
they are and how they relate to the social world. As 
such they are engaged in identity construction and 
negotiation. (Norton, B. 2013: 33) 
This special connection between language, cultural and personal 
identity speaks volume about the state of African indigenous 
languages today. First it is notable that there is hardly any African 
country where the language of education is an African language. In 
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South Africa, the two languages which are used are Afrikaans and 
English. While Afrikaans can in some sense be called an African 
language, it is nevertheless one that has its roots in Dutch and 
Flemish of Holland and Belgium. To the extent that Afrikaans is an 
African language to that extent is it the only African language that is 
the language of instruction in any African university. Even below 
the tertiary level of education, the consistent behaviour is to use 
English as language of instruction even from nursery school.Most 
often the argument in defence of this practice is that foreign colonial 
language gives their learners greater opportunity for the future; their 
mastery gives more assurance of obtaining jobs in the former 
colonies where they are used. 
The pervasive use of colonial languages often occludes the 
fact that in most African countries, less than 50% of the population 
are able to use the dominant colonial language. This means that in 
reality excessive concentration on the use of these languages is a 
hindrance to grass-root communication in many African countries. 
The realization of the awkward situation has nudged many countries 
to adopt the use of African languages at the primary levels of 
education, but this is often not adhered to and so teachers continue to 
teach children in nursery and primary schools in foreign or colonial 
languages in contravention of government policy on education. This 
point cannot be made more poignantly than in the following 
statement which refers specifically to the Nigerian and Igbo 
situation: 
It is a sign of irresponsibility and a mark of 
inefficiency on the part of the government to 
abandon a policy as important as that of language, a 
policy that was made by government herself, which 
has direct implication on education, at the hands of 
business people. School proprietors and even 
government-owned schools absolutely pay no heed 
to the policy and the government pretends to be 
completely ignorant of the happenings in the schools 
who flout the stipulations and proviso of the policy. 
Government ineptitude towards the implementation 
of language policy is slowly and steadily destroying 
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Igbo language and culture. (Ezenwa-Ohaeto & 
Akujobi, 2013: 47) 
An even more aberrant situation is the increasing number of children 
born and bred in big African cities that are unable to speak any 
African language. Their language of education is the foreign colonial 
language, which is also their language of communication at home. 
The result is that these children of the ignorant elite spend their most 
impressive years within Africa, and in towns where 80 to 90 percent 
of the population speak such a language and remain ignorant of it. It 
means that many of such children are completely ignorant of any 
African language. Irrespective of government educational policy of 
the particular country, this attitude explains better the dismal state of 
many African indigenous languages in relation to colonial 
languages. It must therefore not be forgotten that attitudes to 
languages tell more about those who use the language and also the 
use of the language: “people generally do not hold opinions about 
languages in vacuum. They develop attitudes towards languages 
which indicate their views about those who speak the languages, and 
the context and functions with which they are associated.” (Norton: 
410) 
What this means is that in relation to the philosophical quest 
for African identity, the African has changed very significantly that 
one can no longer speak reasonably of an African culture without 
reference to the view of the people about that culture or their attitude 
to it. Language is a vehicle of culture and ultimately the attitude of 
the people to their culture will influence their attitude to their 
language. This attitude is always determined by the expectation of 
future benefits or advantages. It is reported for instance that in 1940 
the Colonial Administrator of Northern Nigeria was convinced to 
introduce English in the educational system in his region by the 
Emirs of six Emirates. They were quoted as telling the colonialist 
that even though they recognized the religious importance of Arabic, 
“knowledge of English is ‘Cigaba’, i.e. progress.” 
(MobolajiAdekunle, p. 63) 
While the opinion of the Emirs is significant, and while the 
subsequent developments have followed their guideline, it goes 
without saying that there is more to the state of African languages in 
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relation to the quest for African identity in contemporary African 
philosophy. Language policies in Africa as well as the attitude of the 
people to their languages are good mirrors of the extent to which 
African cultures were impacted by colonialism. In an interesting 
article, Kwasi Wiredu outlined what he called the paradox of culture 
change. Cultures can change their kernel without changing. But 
when they change their gab they have changed fundamentally. 
Wiredu concluded that since African cultures have been changing 
their gabs, they have changed for good. There may be arguments to 
defend the reluctance of Africans to use their native languages as 
lingua franca and as languages of instruction including that these 
languages lack the necessary modern vocabularies. But no language 
is static. Like culture itself all languages mutate over time, especially 
by the addition of new vocabularies. The colonial languages, 
especially English and French have more foreign words than 
practically all other languages. The main reason why African 
languages are still not used as languages of instruction in school and 
why some educated Africans prefer that their children are not 
speakers of their language is that foreign and colonial languages 
have become status symbol in the colonized African mentality. The 
situation is such that in some quarters it is queerly taken to be a sign 
of special status when African children are not able to speak their 
native languages. Our view is that the mentality that gives rise to 
such incomprehensible phenomenon is the hidden background of the 
failure of African educational institutions to use African languages 
as their languages of instruction, and the failure of African 
governments to effectively use African languages as lingua franca. 
What it means is that the task which contemporary African 
philosophy has received mainly on account of its context of 
evolution is really an uphill task. Most Africans in addition to their 
cultural hybridism are also of the silent conviction that what they 
inherited from their colonial past is superior and language is only 
one of these. The primary direction of contemporary African 
philosophy should be first and foremost to seek a trans-valuation of 
African values. Success in this process will ensure a more fruitful 
quest for African identity.  
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